Solar offensive: which site warrants a study?

A contribution of up to 60% of investment costs made Switzerland's solar offensive look like a shortcut. On the ground, three figures were never enough to make a project: annual generation of 10 GWh, 500 kWh per installed kilowatt during the winter half-year and a public inquiry before the end of 2025 only opened the door to the special regime. Behind it remained land, grid connection, environmental impact, permits, finance and the ability to build at altitude. This article explains what opened in 2022, what remains possible after the window closed and why a promising site can still fail. It then sets out a method for distinguishing projects that warrant a paid study from attractive maps with no active decision behind them. Finally, it shows how priority-account acquisition can put a specialist in front of a small number of relevant decision-makers without treating an alpine niche as a volume campaign. General analysis updated on 6 August 2026. It is not a substitute for a technical study, legal advice or a decision by an authority or funder.

The solar offensive adopted in 2022 permitted accelerated treatment of certain large photovoltaic installations outside building zones and made them eligible for an enhanced one-off payment. It removed neither the environmental impact assessment, grid connection nor permits. Its purpose was to add substantial electricity generation quickly, particularly in winter.

Parliament inserted the regime into Article 71a of the Energy Act on 30 September 2022. The urgent amendments came into force on 1 October, followed by the implementing ordinances on 1 April 2023. An installation meeting the thresholds was treated as being in the national interest and tied to its location. It could be exempt from a cantonal structure plan and land-use plan, but not from a project-specific assessment of its impact.

The Swiss Federal Office of Energy also stresses that the offensive was limited in time and quantity. It was not a nationwide permit for any slope. A project still had to show that its site, generation, access and responsibilities formed a feasible whole.

Which path did a project have to follow?

How to read the diagram. The energy thresholds and public-inquiry date open the route; they do not complete it. The project must still pass land, environmental, technical and financial decisions.

Text alternative. A project below 10 GWh a year, below 500 kWh/kW in winter or placed on public inquiry after 2025 cannot newly enter the Article 71a special regime. A project within the deadline continues through studies, permits, connection, finance and the application for payment.

Diagram sources. Swiss Federal Office of Energy, Large photovoltaic installations and One-off payment for large photovoltaic installations; Fedlex, Energy Act, Article 71a.

A new project can no longer enter Article 71a if its permit application was not placed on public inquiry by 31 December 2025. That deadline does not end projects already admitted to the regime: assessment, the payment application and construction may continue under their own permits and deadlines.

This distinction prevents an expensive mistake. The end of the window does not cancel the solar offensive, but it closes late entry to the special regime. The Swiss Federal Office of Energy states that the payment application can be made once the permit is legally effective. Full commissioning must then occur no later than five years after the final required permit becomes legally effective.

A site identified today may fall under another framework for ground-mounted installations or projects in the national interest. Article 71a benefits cannot simply be transferred to it. Since 1 April 2026, a consolidated cantonal procedure and shorter appeal routes have applied to certain large renewable installations in the national interest. That framework may accelerate a procedure; it does not revive the solar-offensive deadline.

A site becomes technically attractive when it combines high annual output, a strong winter share, usable area and a plausible grid connection. It becomes buildable only after land rights, access, snow and wind, environmental impact, landscape, permits and decommissioning have been assessed. Yield removes none of those constraints.

At altitude, thinner air, less frequent fog and light reflected by snow can improve generation. Based on tests and simulations, the Swiss Federal Office of Energy estimates that a mountain installation may generate about 50% more over a year and two to three times more in winter than a comparable installation on the Central Plateau. These orders of magnitude describe potential, not the output curve of a particular site.

The same source notes the limited large-scale experience in high mountains. Snow and wind loads place greater demands on foundations. Site access, maintenance and connection can be costly. An environmental impact assessment remains mandatory under Article 71a, and the installation must be dismantled after decommissioning. One critical constraint can therefore outweigh the best theoretical yield.

A contribution of up to 60% does not make the project profitable because it is a ceiling on eligible investment costs and depends on uncovered costs established by a profitability calculation. It does not automatically fund every expense, secure the electricity price or offset poorly controlled connection, scheduling or technical risks.

The important words are “up to”. The Swiss Federal Office of Energy calculates the payment case by case after the permit becomes legally effective. The model must distinguish eligible costs, other investment, operating costs, expected generation, revenue and finance. A large payment can reduce the capital requirement without making a project bankable if its assumptions deteriorate.

Three flows must also remain separate. The one-off payment is potential support for the project. Electricity sales generate revenue for the operator. A paid study generates revenue for the specialist that delivers it. Combining those flows would inflate the commercial opportunity: public support measures neither the price of an engagement, its margin nor the number of accessible new clients.

Yield, constraints and access can be shown in one matrix, but they do not always offset one another. Strong output may justify further study; it cannot neutralise major environmental harm, absent land rights or an unrealistic connection. Every dimension needs evidence, an owner and a decision to proceed or stop.

How to read the matrix. The priority quadrant requires both defensible value and sufficiently documented feasibility. A high-yield site blocked by an unmanaged constraint remains a risk, not an opportunity to push artificially.

Text alternative. High-value, high-feasibility sites progress to study. Feasible but low-value sites must prove their economics. Promising but blocked sites address the critical constraint first. Sites weak on both axes leave the portfolio.

The methodology published in 2025 by the federal offices for spatial development, the environment, energy and agriculture provides geographical guidance for cantons. It is not binding on authorities. A map helps identify sites; it never replaces assessment of a project.

Evidence and decisions are distributed: the owner secures the land; the developer organises the project; engineers establish output and connection; environmental specialists document impacts; the canton assesses permits; the Swiss Federal Office of Energy assesses the payment; and the funder decides whether the risk is acceptable. No intermediary can speak for them.

File quality depends less on the number of documents than on their relationships. The site plan must align with the yield assessment. Output must connect to a grid study. The permit timetable must feed the financial model. Land rights, construction access and decommissioning need named owners. No isolated document can replace that coherence.

For a technical practice, engineering consultancy or specialist adviser, this distribution clarifies the offer. The provider does not sell “the solar offensive”. It sells an assigned part of the decision: yield review, option comparison, gap mapping, grid-connection strategy, file coordination or a financial model, according to its genuine competence and authority.

The first deliverable can be a site-readiness review covering thresholds, permits already under way, rights, existing studies, connection, finance and critical unknowns. It ends with a documented decision—investigate further, complete the file or stop—without promising a permit, payment or construction.

The defined scope reduces friction. A decision-maker does not immediately buy every study needed for an alpine project. It pays to establish whether the material already assembled justifies the next expenditure and which specialist should own it. Price, deadline, responsible person and limits must be agreed with the partner before the service is promoted.

Continuity then comes from real decisions: a detailed study, connection option, environmental file, financing structure, tender or permit monitoring. It should not be turned into a subscription in advance. Every stage must answer a new question that the partner is capable of resolving.

Priority accounts combine an identifiable project, a decision that remains open, an accessible responsible person and a need matching the partner's deliverable precisely. A municipality, energy company or developer is not a priority by name alone if it has no active site. Conversely, a small documented portfolio may justify highly personalised outreach.

The portfolio should begin with projects placed on public inquiry within the deadline, the updated federal map, cantonal and municipal announcements, permit applications, public decisions and named parties. These signals show that a file exists; they do not prove that an engagement remains available. Research must still identify the stage, decision owner, specialists already appointed and the gap the partner could resolve.

The hierarchy protects the partner's reputation. It concentrates research on a few accounts whose context is understood and adapts the message to the missing decision. It avoids sending the same promise to every alpine municipality, landowner or electricity supplier.

Targeted acquisition opens conversations by linking a public signal to a specific decision and a partner's verifiable capability. Research documents the account; content explains the problem; email or a call checks the need; and referrers confirm context. The aim is a small number of conversations qualified well enough to warrant expert time.

Search, public registers, cantonal announcements and the Swiss Federal Office of Energy map create an initial list. Professional networks identify the function leading the project. A personalised email then asks one question about the observed stage. A call or voice message checks whether the decision remains open. Referrers—lawyers, environmental consultancies, grid engineers and funders—can confirm timing without disclosing confidential information.

Organic search and specialist content serve decision-makers already looking for an answer. Advertising may support content for an approved account list, but should not build a mass audience around the word “subsidy”. Events suit cross-cutting questions such as connection, financial modelling and experience, provided they remain useful to projects actually in progress.

Measurement follows quality: documented account, response from the correct decision-maker, compatible need, proposed review, first purchase signed and paid. Results observed on comparable engagements remain confidential. This article publishes no volume, conversion rate or revenue not established for this specific market.

The strategy must change when accounts no longer have an open decision, the need lies outside the partner's capabilities, the first deliverable is not purchased or delivery capacity is full. In a niche, stopping a weak target protects margin more effectively than multiplying reminders and channels.

The verdict may therefore be positive without supporting a broad campaign. A few A-level accounts, a well-defined deliverable and defensible margin may be enough for a premium strategy. Conversely, a map rich in sites but empty of accessible decisions should produce a no-go decision.

The sources defining this article's limits are the Energy Act on Fedlex, Swiss Federal Office of Energy pages on large installations and their payment, Federal Council decisions and the federal methodology for suitable areas. They establish the framework; they prove neither the purchase of a study nor campaign results.

Documents used: Fedlex, Energy Act, Article 71a; Swiss Parliament, urgent measures of 30 September 2022; Federal Council, solar-offensive ordinances in force from 1 April 2023; Swiss Federal Office of Energy, Large photovoltaic installations and One-off payment for large photovoltaic installations, consulted on 6 August 2026; Federal Council, accelerated procedure in force from 1 April 2026; Federal Office for Spatial Development, Federal Office for the Environment, Swiss Federal Office of Energy and Federal Office for Agriculture, Methodological basis for assessing suitable areas, 2025.

The Electricity Act article extends the analysis to generation, consumption and network configurations. The article on the first photovoltaic auctions examines a different decision: preparing a bid without promising the award. Other related articles continue to be generated dynamically from the Swiss English registry.

A similar strategy starts with a completely free eligibility test: getfishnet considers your acquisition challenge, the market you can genuinely serve, first deliverable, evidence, capacity and expected economics. If a credible development fit exists, we build a tailored strategy; otherwise, the decision helps avoid a poorly targeted campaign.

The test promises neither permits, payments nor clients. It checks whether your expertise can meet an active decision and whether acquisition can be precise enough to protect expert time.